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RUNYON v. McCRARY AND THE MOSAIC OF
STATE ACTION
RONALD D. ROTUNDA*
I. INTRODUCTION
It is said that three basic lies were told in the 1960s. First, "The check
is in the mail." Second, "I'll respect you just as much in the morning."
And third, "I'm from the Government and here to help you." The three
lies of the 1980s are a little different. First, "My BMW is paid for."
Second, "This is only a cold sore." And third, "I'm from the Govern-
ment and here to help you." As this little story illustrates, a basic truth
of life is that some issues never change. Unfortunately, one of these ever-
present issues is the continuing effort of black citizens to achieve equal
protection under the law.
In Runyon v. McCrary,' decided a dozen years ago, the Supreme
Court, in a six to two decision, took an important step in making real the
promises of the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments. The Runyon ma-
jority, after examining the legislative history, concluded that section 1981
of title 422, a century-old statute, meant exactly what it appeared to
mean. The statute, said the Court, prohibits individuals or entities from
refusing to engage in contracts solely because of the race of the other
party to the contract.
Runyon acknowledged that section 1981 applies only to so-called pub-
lic contracts, that is, to contracts made to the world at large. The case
involved two private schools in Virginia-Bobbe's School in Arlington,
and Fairfax-Brewster School, Inc., in Fairfax County. Both schools were
"private" schools in the sense that neither was tax supported, but both
solicited offers of enrollment from the world at large. Like a Sears, Roe-
buck & Co. catalogue, which is sent to prospective customers without
any trappings of exclusiveness or the intent to choose (or appearance of
* Professor of Law, University of Illinois.
1. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
2. Title 42 U.S.C. § 1981 provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every
state and territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to
the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and prop-
erty as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penal-
ties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
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choosing) customers on any selective or elite basis, these schools widely
mailed their brochures to prospective customers whom they addressed as
"resident." And, like Sears, the schools, in an effort to find customers,
advertized in places such as the yellow pages of the telephone directory.
The lower court found that both schools had denied admission to qual-
ified black children solely because of their race. If the children had been
white, they would have been admitted. The district court then held that
section 1981 applied to bar such private racial discrimination and entered
an injunction. Both the en banc Fourth Circuit and the Supreme Court
affirmed this ruling.3
The main issue before the Court was whether section 1981 should be
construed as the district court had interpreted it. While all of the Jus-
tices agreed that Congress could constitutionally enact such a statute,
Justice White, joined by Justice Rehnquist, dissented and argued that
Congress had not intended any portion of section 1981 to reach private
conduct.4
If a contract with these schools had a basis of exclusivity other than
race, Runyon made clear that section 1981, by its own terms, would be
simply inapplicable. Thus, Runyon would not apply to cases where dis-
crimination was based on gender (such as an all-girl or all-boy private
school), or to discrimination based on religion (such as a private religious
school admitting only children who believed in a particular faith). In
fact, the Court was not even deciding that section 1981 applied to reli-
gious schools that discriminated on the basis of race but did so because of
the tenets of the particular religious beliefs.5 Nor would Runyon apply
to private schools that discriminated in fact, but that did so pursuant to a
plan of subjective exclusiveness truly applied equally to whites as well as
blacks.6
3. The Fourth Circuit did reverse the district court's order awarding attorney fees. See Mc-
Crary v. Runyon, 515 F.2d 1082 (1975). The Supreme Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit in all
respects. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 186.
4. See 427 U.S. at 192 n.2 (White, J., joined by Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("I do not question
at this point the power of Congress or a state legislature to ban racial discrimination in private
school admissions. But as I see it Congress has not yet chosen to exercise that power.").
5. The Court explained that a school that discriminated on the basis of race because of reli-
gious reasons might have a free exercise right to do so under the first amendment as applied to the
states through the fourteenth amendment. See 427 U.S. at 167 & n.6. However, the Court noted,
defendants made no such claims in Runyon.
6. Thus, in Riley v. Adirondack Southern School for Girls, 368 F. Supp. 392 (M.D. Fla.
1973), the court ruled in favor of the private school after it concluded that race was not the only
reason for the black girl's rejection. 368 F. Supp. at 397. Cf. United States v. Pelzer Realty Co., 484
[Vol. 67:47
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Similarly, other proposed contracts, such as those involving personal
contractual relationships, were not covered by section 1981, because the
section intended to reach only "public" contracts. Such "private" con-
tracts, intimate or personal in nature, "have a discernible rule of exclu-
sivity which is inoffensive to § 198 l." 7 In addition, the Court suggested,
a contrary interpretation might run afoul of first amendment rights of
association.' Thus, where the offeror-
selects those with whom he desires to bargain on an individualized basis, or
where the contract is the foundation of a close association (such as, for
example, that between an employer and a private tutor, babysitter, or
housekeeper), there is reason to assume that, although the choice made by
the offerer is selective, it reflects "a purpose of exclusiveness" other than the
desire to bar members of the Negro race.9
Runyon has been the law for a dozen years, and has been used in a
variety of cases involving "public" contracts such as lawsuits against pri-
vate schools that discriminate in their admission policies solely' ° and in-
F.2d 438, 443 (5th Cir. 1973) (Fifth Circuit reversed lower court finding of good faith in real estate
contracts despite finding that "circumstances would not have occurred in a proposed sale to a
white"). Cf. also Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431, 438 (1973) (violation
by an association that "was open to every white person within the geographic area, there being no
selective element other than race"); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 236 (1969)
(same).
Of course, it is not sufficient for the private school merely to assert that it is truly exclusive. See
Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc., 501 F.2d 324, 337-39 (7th Cir. 1974) (under § 1982 claim, court
held that the truth of defendant's assertion that it followed a uniform policy that inherently excluded
minorities is a question that must go to the jury).
Runyon, thus, is consistent with Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972), which al-
lowed the Moose Lodge to discriminate against blacks even though the Moose Lodge was using one
of the state's liquor licenses. Although the number of liquor licenses the state would issue was
limited, the Court found that merely granting the Moose Lodge one of these licenses did not create
state action. This case would presumably not come out any differently if the plaintiff had sued under
§ 1981, because the Moose Lodge is not open to the world; it is a private association where race is
not the only criteria of exclusiveness.
7. McCrary v. Runyon, 515 F.2d at 1082, 1088. See also 427 U.S. at 187 (Powell, J., concur-
ring) (holding that § 1981 applies to "private individuals does not imply the intrusive investigation
into the motives of every refusal to contract by a private citizen...").
8. See 427 U.S. at 178 (this case "does not represent governmental intrusion into the privacy
of the home or a similarly intimate setting .... (footnote omitted)). See also 427 U.S. at 187-88
(Powell, J., concurring).
9. 427 U.S. at 187-88 (Powell, J., concurring). Cf. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S.
163 (1972), discussed supra note 6.
10. Run)on stated that § 1981 would be violated "if a private offeror refused to extend to a
Negro, solely because he is a Negro, the same opportunity to enter into contracts as he extends to
white offerees." 427 U.S. at 170-71 (footnote omitted). Later, in General Building Contractors As-
1989]
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tentionally" on the basis of race, or against private employers who
similarly discriminate in hiring.12 The opinion, unlike some that the
Court has issued in recent years, has not been a lightning rod drawing
attacks from academics or others. As one opponent of Runyon has even
admitted: "So far, the monetary impact of Section 1981 appears to have
been modest. Intentional discrimination is still fairly hard to
prove.... 13
While the monetary impact of section 1981 may, thus far, have been
modest, its enforcement role is very important. Section 1981 occupies an
important place in the mosaic of civil rights. Unlike virtually all of its
more modem counterparts, section 1981 gives individual victims a
straightforward right to collect compensatory and punitive damages
from those who intentionally discriminate on the basis of race. "The
threat of being forced to pay compensatory and punitive damages is
clearly one of the most effective deterrents against racial discrimination a
free society can provide." 4
Thus, most people were quite surprised 5 when, in Patterson v. Mc-
Lean Credit Union, 6 the Court, in a short, five to four per curiam opin-
ion, ordered the parties to brief the question whether the interpretation of
section 1981 adopted in Runyon v. McCrary should be reconsidered. The
sociation v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 307, 388 (1982), the Supreme Court quoted this language and
underscored the phrase "solely because he is a Negro."
11. Section 1981 applies only to intentional discrimination. General Building Contractors As-
sociation v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375 (1982). See also, eg., Croker v. Boeing Co., 662 F.2d 975,
984-89 (3d Cir. 1981)(en banc) (legislative intent reveals "concern with direct intentional abuses");
Mescall v. Burrus, 603 F.2d 1266, 1269-71 (7th Cir. 1979) (claim by Chicago policeman alleging
discrimination in the selection of the Board of Trustees of Policeman's Annuity and Benefit Fund
dismissed for failure to show purposeful discrimination).
12. E.g., McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976) (Section 1981
prohibits discrimination against white workers who were discharged while black worker charged
with the same offense was not discharged); General Building Contractors Association v. Penn-
sylvania, 458 U.S. 375 (1982) (claim against union and Joint Apprenticeship Training group re-
manded for finding of intentional discrimination).
13. Greve, Overrule Runyon? Yes, 74 A.B.A. J. 38 (1988).
14. Courter, Send Congress Back to Civil-Rights Front, Wall St. J., Oct. 21, 1988, at AI0, col. 4-
6 (midwest ed.).
15. See Farber, Statutory Interpretation, Legislative Inaction, and Civil Rights, 87 MIcH. L.
REV. 2 n.3 (1988) (New York Times, New Republic, Newsweek all ran stories on the new conservative
majority of the Court "running roughshod over legal precedents"). The Court did not elaborate on
its reasons for reconsidering Runyon. One is reminded of Professor Monaghan's comment that, at
times, "stare decisis seemingly operates with the randomness of a lightning bolt: on occasion it may
strike, but when and where can be known only after the fact." Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Consti-
tutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 723, 743 (1988).
16. 108 S. Ct. 1419 (1988) (per curiam).
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four dissenters complained that neither "the parties nor the Solicitor
General have argued that Runyon should be considered."17
It is ironic to note that when Runyon was argued, Solicitor General
Robert Bork filed an amicus brief urging the Court to adopt the position
eventually embraced by the majority in Runyon. Years later, the Senate,
after a lengthy confirmation battle, rejected the nomination of Judge
Robert Bork to the Supreme Court; various Senators expressed concern
that Robert Bork might vote to overturn precedent. Although Robert
Bork would not have voted to reconsider Runyon (he, after all, had origi-
nally urged the Court to decide Runyon the way it did), Justice Anthony
Kennedy (whom the Senate quickly and overwhelmingly confirmed after
it had rejected Judge Bork) joined the five person majority ordering the
Runyon precedent be reconsidered.18
II. RUNYON AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
I do not dispute Dr. McClellan's view that the legislative history relied
on by the Runyon majority is not crystal clear. The conclusions that the
Court drew in Runyon regarding legislative history certainly are not in-
evitable in the sense that it is inevitable that the night follows the day.
But legislative history is often unclear. By its very nature, debates about
legislative history are seldom like games of chess, where the winner can
convince the loser that the king really was checkmated. In matters of
legislative history, the debate can be endless.
Sometimes, when you search legislative history and original intent, the
answer you receive is a function of the question you ask.19 In EEOC v.
Wyoming 2° , for example, the dissenting justices-in objecting to the ma-
jority allowing the federal commerce power to reach game wardens em-
ployed by the State of Wyoming-said that the framers never really
intended to give the federal government the power to regulate game war-
dens in Wyoming. 2' The dissent is absolutely correct; I would further
17. 108 S. Ct. at 1423 (Stevens, J., joined by Brennan, Marshall, & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting).
18. The present Solicitor General has filed no amicus brief in Patterson.
The Senate rejected Robert Bork's nomination to the Supreme Court on October 31, 1987, by a
vote of 42 to 58. On February 3, 1988, the Senate confirmed Anthony Kennedy's nomination by a
vote of 97 to 0.
19. See Levinson, On Interpretation: The Adultery Clause of the Ten Commandments, 58 S.
CAL. L. Rav. 719 (1985).
20. 460 U.S. 226 (1983).
21. Id. at 263-64: (Burger, C.J., joined by Powell, Rehnquist, & O'Connor, JJ. dissenting)
("There is no hint in the body of the Constitution ratified in 1789 or in the relevant Amendments
1989]
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stipulate that the framers never even thought of Wyoming. But if you
phrase the dissent's view of original intent a little differently, you will
reach a different answer.
Did the framers propose to give Congress the power to regulate effec-
tively commercial matters among the states-even if the commerce does
not cross a state line? Certainly, one of the main reasons behind our
Constitution was the desire to grant the central government an effective
power over that commerce which affects more than one state.22 As. soci-
ety becomes more complex and interrelated, it is much more likely that
what happens in one state affects what happens in another. As long ago
as Gibbons v. Ogden,23 Chief Justice Marshall said that the federal com-
merce power includes the power to regulate commerce that is wholly in
one state yet affects another state. In The Daniel Ball,24 a decision ren-
dered well over a century ago, the Court continued Chief Justice Mar-
shall's principle and easily applied the federal commerce power to that
commerce which did not cross a state line, but affected more than one
state.25 It is not too surprising to think that, by the 1980s, commerce
among the states has become much more interrelated than it was two
hundred years ago and that, consequently, the scope of the federal com-
merce power is greater.
Similarly, one can look at the legislative history of Section 1981 and
assume that the Court's position in Runyon was not inevitable. How-
ever, neither can it be said that the position the majority took is outra-
geous or clearly erroneous.26 The original decision, we must remember,
that every classification based on age is outlawed.... The Framers did not give Congress the power
to decide local employment standards .... "). See also EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. at 266 (Powell,
J., joined by O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("[O]ne can be reasonably sure that few of the Founding
Fathers thought that trade barriers among the States were 'the central problem,' or that their elimi-
nation was the 'central mission' of the Constitutional Convention.").
22. One of the major forces that led to the Constitutional Convention of 1787 was the inability
of the central government under the Articles of Confederation to regulate effectively that commerce
which controls more states than one. See, eg., Rotunda, Bicentennial Lessons from the Constitu-
tional Convention of 1787, 21 SUFFOLK L. REv. 589, 591-97 (1987).
23. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
24. 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1824).
25. See also, eg., Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905); Houston, East & West
Texas Railway v. United States (The Shreveport Case), 234 U.S. 342 (1914); Railroad Comm'n of
Wisconsin v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry. Co., 257 U.S. 563 (1922); Stafford v. Wallace, 258
U.S. 495 (1922).
26. If the earlier decision is not clearly erroneous, it normally should not be overruled. As the
Supreme Court has noted:
While stare decisis is not an inexorable command, the careful observer will discern that any
[Vol. 67:47
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was seven to two. The seven person majority included Justices spanning
the entire spectrum of philosophies of judicial review. Though a refer-
ence to political labels is often not very enlightening when looking at
judicial philosophies, 7 it is of more than passing moment that joining the
majority opinion of Justice Stewart were Chief Justice Burger and Jus-
tices Blackmun, Powell, Stevens, Brennan, and Marshall. 8 On many is-
sues these Justices have disagreed, yet on Runyon they spoke with one
voice. This unusual harmony suggests that the decision was hardly ex-
treme or excessive in its conclusions. The composition of the Runyon
majority does not have the indicia of an outrageous mistake.
As Dr. McClellan noted in his paper,29 President Andrew Johnson
had vetoed the law that became section 1981 because he thought that it
tried to provide for "perfect equality" among the races. President John-
son read the law very dramatically. He interpreted the law in roughly
the same way that the Court did in Runyon. Congress, we know, over-
rode his veto. Is it so clearly erroneous for the Runyon Court to con-
clude that the Reconstruction Congress also read the law the same way,
and that was its reason for overturning Johnson's veto?30 Not all com-
detours from the straight path of stare decisis in our past have occurred for articulable
reasons, and only when the Court has felt obliged 'to bring its opinions into agreement with
experience and with facts newly ascertained.'
Our history does not impose any rigid formula to constrain the Court in the disposition
of cases. Rather, its lesson is that every successful proponent of overruling precedent has
borne the heavy burden of persuading the Court that changes in society or in the law
dictate that the values served by stare decisis yield in favor of a greater objective.
Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 266 (1986) (citations omitted).
27. See R. ROTUNDA, THE POLrrxcs oF LANGUAGE 3-17, 88-98 (1986).
28. Justice Stevens, it is true, joined Runyon because he believed that its conclusion was com-
pelled by a similar interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 1982 in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409
(1968). In that case, Justice Harlan, joined by Justice White, dissented. Their view of the meaning
of the relevant legislative history was different from that of the majority, but they did not even
suggest the majority's reading was clearly erroneous. The dissent argued only that the debates on
the Civil Rights Act of 1966 do not "overwhelmingly support the result reached by the Court, and in
fact ... a contrary conclusion may equally well be drawn," 392 U.S. at 454 (Harlan, J., joined by
White, J., dissenting).
29. McClellan, The Foibles and Fables of Runyon, 67 WASH. U.L.Q. 13, 30 (1989).
30. When one looks at the intent of the Congress that enacted § 1981, one is struck by the fact
that, in the period after the Civil War, many people did in fact intend to eliminate all vestiges of
slavery. Congress' enactment of the broad protection found in the Civil Rights Act of 1875 is proof
of such a broad intent. That Act provided criminal penalties when private persons, without state
action, discriminated against people solely on grounds of race. In the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3
(1883), the Court invalidated this law in a case involving prosecutions of people, for example, "refus-
ing a colored person a seat in the dress circle of Maguire's theatre in San Francisco," and "denying
to persons of color the accommodations and privileges of an inn or hotel." The Civil Rights Cases
also involved a private action to recover a statutory penalty when "the gravaman was the refusal by
Washington University Open Scholarship
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mentators share Dr. McClellan's view of the legislative history.31
III. STATE ACTION AND THE ROLE OF R? UNYON
Runyon fits logically into the constitutional mosaic of state action.
More than that, if fills a significant gap that otherwise would exist in the
state action doctrine. Its role in this regard is best understood by noting
several developments. For many years, state action was akin to a juris-
dictional concept. The Supreme Court treated state action like a wo-
man's pregnancy: one cannot be a little bit pregnant, and one cannot
have a little state action. You either have it or you do not have it.32
Then, in a series of cases the Court suggested otherwise. In Amalga-
mated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley33 the Court held that
striking laborers had a right to enter a private shopping mall to picket a
store with which they were having a labor dispute. The majority de-
dared that the shopping center was the functional equivalent of a busi-
ness district in a company owned (i.e., privately owned) town, and a
company town, the Court had earlier held, performed a "public func-
tion" and this performance constituted state action.34 Because the Court
found state action, the shopping center's efforts to prevent the picketers
from demonstrating violated the first amendment right of free speech, as
applied to the state through the fourteenth amendment.
A few years later, antiwar demonstrators claimed that they also had a
first amendment right to distribute antiwar leaflets to customers of an-
other privately owned shopping mall. In this case, Lloyd Corp. v. Tan-
the conductor of the railroad company to allow the wife to ride in the ladies' car, for the reason, as
stated in one of the counts that she was a person of African descent."
31. Eg., Farber, Statutory Interpretation, Legislative Inaction, and Civil Rights, 87 MICH. L.
REv. 2, 7 (1988) ("Thus, the Runyon Court was on solid ground in rejecting [Justice] White's mea-
ger historical evidence for his interpretation.").
32. See generally 2 R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK, & J. YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE §§ 16.1-16.5 (1986).
33. 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
In Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), the Court hinted in the direction of a sliding scale
when it suggested that in determining whether something was "state action" the Court might take
into account the importance of the activity and the necessity of its coming under constitutional
safeguards. See Marsh, 326 U.S. at 508-09 nn.5-6 (Court notes that a very large percentage of coal
miners live in company towns and that often these towns are involved with "the suppression of civil
liberties" which creates "the need of those who live there for Constitutional protection").
See generally Glennon & Nowak, A Functional Analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment "State
Action"Requirement, 1976 Sup. CT. REV. 221.
34, Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
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ner,35 the Court sought to distinguish Logan Valley by noting that the
speech involved in that case related in a direct way to the activities of the
shopping center. But the "handbilling by respondents in the malls of
Lloyd Center had no relation to any purpose for which the center was
built and being used."36 And, said the Court, "it must be remembered
that the first and fourteenth amendments safeguard the rights of free
speech and assembly by limitations on state action, not on action by the
owner of private property used nondiscriminatorily for private purposes
only."' 37 The Supreme Court, in effect, said that the existence of state
action is a function of the right one asserts and the context in which one
asserts it. Thus, there might be state action when a giant shopping mall
forbids picketers protesting the employment policies of a company in the
mall, but not when the picketers are protesting general policies not re-
lated to the mall, such as Viet Nam war policy.
Shortly after Lloyd, the Court backed away from this sliding scale view
of state action. The Justices concluded that such an approach was too
open-ended and result oriented. Thus, in Hudgens v. National Labor Re-
lations Board 38 the Court explicitly overruled Logan Valley and held that
privately owned shopping centers are not state action. Under the present
law, there either is, or is not, state action for all purposes, regardless of
the alleged right being asserted.
This position, however, has created for the Court other troubles. Be-
cause there never has been a lower threshold of state action for race ques-
tions or a higher level for procedural due process, the Supreme Court
soon discovered that its efforts to prevent state action from turning into a
concept that would swallow up all private activity would, in turn, yield
results that the Court found illogical and unacceptable. For example, let
us assume that the local, privately owned electrical utility shuts off my
power for alleged nonpayment of bills. Assume further that this utility
has a state granted monopoly and, like all utilities, is heavily regulated.
If the utility were state owned, the user of electrical services would have
a right to procedural due process before the utility could terminate his
use for nonpayment of his bills.39 Is it similarly a federal question when-
ever a privately owned (but state regulated) utility terminates someone's
35. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
36. Id. at 564 (footnote omitted).
37. Id. at 567 (emphasis in original).
38. 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
39. Memphis Light, Gas, and Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1 (1978).
1989]
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service? In Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison,' the Court was unwilling to
extend state action that far. It refused to find state action even though
the utility received financial benefit from being licensed as the only utility
in town.
Justice Marshall, in his dissent in Metropolitan Edison, recognized that
the "majority's conclusion that there is no state action in this case is
likely guided in part by its reluctance to impose on a utility company
burdens that might ultimately hurt consumers more than it would help
them."41 But, given the fact that "different standards [do not] apply to
state action analysis when different constitutional claims are
presented,"42 the result of Metropolitan Edison is that "the majority's
analysis would seemingly apply as well to a company that refused to ex-
tend service to Negroes, welfare recipients, or any other group that the
company preferred, for its own reasons, not to serve." 43
Notwithstanding Justice Marshall's concerns, after Metropolitan
Edison the Court continued to limit the state action doctrine in cases like
Rendell-Baker v. Kohn,' where the Court held that the activities of a
private school do not become state action merely because the state pays
the tuition of most of the school's students. In that case the state's pay-
ments to the "private" school (which specialized in educating students
with various educational and behavioral problems) accounted for up to
ninety-nine percent of the school's funding.45 The Court simply said:
"Acts of such private contractors do not become acts of the government
by reason of their significant or even total engagement in performing
public contracts."" The issues in Kohn involved the procedural due pro-
cess and free speech rights for teachers who were terminated.
Would Kohn allow a state to pay students' tuition to a school that
discriminated in the hiring and firing of teachers on the basis of race?
The Court in Kohn tried to suggest otherwise,47 but the Lloyd/Logan
40. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
41. Id. at 373 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justices Douglas and Brennan also filed dissenting
opinions.
42. Id. at 373-74 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 374 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
44. 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
45. Id. at 832.
46. Id. at 841. See also Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982), where the Court held that due
process principles do not restrict a nursing home's freedom to discharge or transfer patients. The
Court found no state action even though the state subsidized the operating and capital costs of the
nursing homes and paid the medical expenses of more than 90% of the patients. Id. at 1011.
47. See id. at 842 n.7.
[Vol. 67:47
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Valley/Hudgens line of cases casts doubt on any argument that the defi-
nition of state action would vary depending on the nature of the alleged
constitutional infringement: if the Court found no state action in Kohn
for procedural due process or free speech purposes, it is unlikely that it
could find state action for equal protection purposes.
Do cases like Metropolitan Edison and Kohn really mean that a pri-
vately owned utility, the only utility in town, can constitutionally termi-
nate services to the black ghetto in the town? Should a state be able to
avoid its equal protection obligation by contracting out its education re-
sponsibilities to private contractors? Given the Court decisions narrow-
ing the state action doctrine, Marshall's concern in Metropolitan Edison
appears less and less hypothetical.
The Court did not have to reach such issues because Runyon neatly
fits into the state action mosaic. Runyon takes care of such problems.
Instead of having a mosaic with an important piece missing, we have a
complete picture, where everything fits.4" Section 1981 prohibits the pri-
vately owned utility or school from discriminating on the basis of race.
IV. CONCLUSION
What if Runyon is overruled? At the very minimum, a world without
Runyon likely will force the Court to deal with many more difficult ques-
tions of state action involving the state granting subsidies to, or con-
tracting with, private persons or entities who may discriminate on the
basis of race.49 With Runyon in place, the Court can avoid deciding
these constitutional questions. If Runyon is overruled the Supreme
Court may also begin to push, shove, extend, and perhaps even distort
the law of state action in order to avoid incongruous results that would,
48. In another part of this mosaic, the Court held that § 198i is applicable to racial discrimina-
tion in private employment against white persons. In other words, whites as well as blacks can sue
under this statute if they allege racial discrimination. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427
U.S. 273 (1976) (Marshall, J., for the Court). This holding is important, because if § 1981 only
allows blacks (but not whites) to sue, it raises an affirmative action/reverse discrimination question.
The majority's holding in McDonald undercuts the argument that the statute may be unconstitu-
tional because it applies to protect only blacks.
49. The problem of indirect subsidies in the form of tax deductibility is unlikely to require
much Supreme Court attention because the Court has ruled that the Internal Revenue Service is
acting within its authority when it denies tax exempt status to schools--even religiously affiliated
schools-that discriminate in admissions or educational policy on the grounds of race. Bob Jones
Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
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for example, allow the state to relieve itself of equal protection responsi-
bilities in education by contracting with private parties.
Congress, of course, could always enact new legislation to overrule any
Supreme Court decision narrowing the Runyon interpretation of section
1981. Such a result is not at all unlikely, given the number of Senators
and Representatives who have signed amicus papers in support of the
holding in Runyon, as Judge Frankel has already pointed out in his re-
marks."0 Moreover, Congress need not wait until the Supreme Court
acts. Congress could now moot the entire issue posed by the Patterson
case simply by enacting legislation guaranteeing the rights embraced in
the Runyon holding. Such legislation has already been introduced, but
Congress, unfortunately, appears to be more content reacting to Patter-
son than taking the lead in the march to protect civil rights.5"
The fact that Congress can overrule a narrowing interpretation of sec-
tion 1981 is not, however, an argument for the Supreme Court to reverse
itself and overrule Runyon. Rather, it is an argument for the Court not
to reverse itself: if the Court erred in Runyon, Congress can correct the
Court without going through the cumbersome procedures of a constitu-
tional amendment. In such cases, there should be no need to relax the
normal presumption against stare decisis.52
Neither legislative history nor legal logic compels the Court to over-
rule Runyon. Indeed, the realities of both counsel the Court to reaffirm
Runyon, a vital piece in the mosaic of the state action doctrine.
50. Frankel, Runyon v. McCrary Should Not Be Overruled, 67 WASH. U.L.Q., 1, 1-2 (1989).
51. Courter, Send Congress Back to Civil-Rights Front, Wall St. J., Oct. 21, 1988, at A1O, col. 4,
6 (midwest ed.).
52. Commentators have often noted that there is a stronger argument for the Court not to relax
the rigors of stare decisis when the Supreme Court is interpreting an act of Congress. See Frickey,
Stare Decisis in Constitutional Cases: Reconsidering National League of Cities, 2 CONsT. COMMEN-
TARY 123 (1985).
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